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t
This Essay develops an alternative theory of market-inalienability and
applies it in an analysis of the consequences of the ban on markets in organs.
Unlike the conventional view-that the ban is responsible for critical
shortages-this theory rests on two ideas: (1) When a market in a good is
banned, those who assume the task of procurement will turn to alternative
means-exhortation-to induce supply; and (2) Legislation that renders a
particular good market-inalienable effectively converts the good into common
property, which can be analyzed using the well-developed economic theory
concerning the allocation of resources owned in common. Theoretically, a
ban on a market in a good that costs less to obtain by exhortation than to
purchase might yield a larger supply than a market would. The findings imply
that it may be the obstacles to adequate exhortation, rather than the
inefficiency of appeals to donor altruism, that are responsible for shortages.
While this does not suggest that a ban on markets is efficient, it does
demonstrate that the ban need not cause a shortage of some limited set of
goods and services, which may include organs. Indeed, rather counter-
intuitively, a ban could-however inefficiently-enlarge supply.
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Introduction
Societies have long sought to regulate ethically questionable activities by
banning markets. Today, the United States bans markets in elephant tusks,
endangered species, slaves, human organs, babies, sex, forms of child labor,
and certain hazardous activities. But whereas some market bans-such as
those covering elephant tusks and endangered species-were enacted to
prohibit trade altogether, the bans on markets in children, sexual favors, and
human organs are characterized by a desire that supply flourish, but strictly on
a donative, non-commercial basis.
The chief aim of this Essay is to examine the economic theory of market
bans as it pertains to these latter ethically problematic subjects whose supply
society wishes to encourage. The theory of market-inalienability that I
present here is essentially a "thought experiment," deriving hypothetical
circumstances under which a market would not result in a greater supply than
would a system that relies on donations alone. The theory rests on two
insights: (1) In the absence of a market, procurers of market-inalienable goods
and services employ an alternative production technique by which they
expend effort to exhort suppliers to donate; and (2) An essential feature of
market bans is that they make the good or service at issue into common
property, and the effort expended to exhort suppliers to donate is thus
fundamentally analogous to "fishing" in a commons.
The conventional analysis of common property shows that it is over-
exploited, leading to Hardin's famous "tragedy of the commons."2 For at least
some market-inalienable goods and services, however, the over-exploitation
of the commons could, in theory, lead to a supply even greater than market
supply. Moreover, unlike the over-fishing of the ocean commons, excess
production of a market-inalienable good like human organs would not reduce
I. Building on a distinguished philosophical tradition, Radin rejected the commodification of
"things important to personhood" and coined the term "market-inalienable" to characterize goods to
which individuals have all property rights except the right to alienate through sale. See Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1850, 1903 (1987).
2. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243 (1968).
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future supplies. Rather, organs otherwise fated to be discarded would be
procured. In demonstrating this concealed blessing of the market-inalienable
commons, this Essay directly challenges one of the principal objections to
market bans-namely, that they necessarily cause reductions in supply.
Because the human organ transplantation industry is of large scale, and
because the ban on the market in organs is blamed for shortages and long
waiting lists,3 the procurement of donated organs serves as an excellent case-
study of the effect of banning a market. Although the theory presented in the
following pages is worked out in terms of the organ transplantation industry, it
is applicable to a larger domain of ethically problematic activities that society
regulates by banning markets.
After reviewing the economic arguments in the debate between Richard
Titmuss and Kenneth Arrow over the desirability of a ban on the market in
blood, I then review the economic argument that demonstrates that banning
markets leads necessarily to shortages. I show this formulation to be
fundamentally inapplicable to human organs and to many other market-
inalienable goods, and I present "exhortation" as the centerpiece of an
alternative conception of the effect of a market ban. I also discuss the role of
exhortation in the procurement of market-inalienable goods, using organs as
an illustration. I argue that market bans create common property and that
exhortation is, in effect, "fishing" in common property "waters." I also derive
the result that the organ commons may be over-exhorted. Using this model, I
explore conditions under which a market in human organs would not generate
greater supply than a strictly donative system would produce. I conclude by
drawing some of the implications of the analysis.
I. The Debate Between Titmuss and Arrow over Banning a Market in Blood
The modem debate over markets in human tissue began with Richard
Titmuss, who argued that an altruistic blood procurement system was not only
more ethical than a market, but also more efficient.4 He found the basis for
this claim of efficiency in comparisons of blood quality under the two
systems: Titmuss presented evidence suggesting that a commercial system
subjected both recipients and donors to unnecessary risks.' He reported studies
that showed that hepatitis rates from blood transfusions were much lower
3. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: OR, ALTRUISM RUN AMUCK (Univ.
of Chicago, 'Occasional Papers from the Law School No. 31, 1994). In 1994, 25% (724 out of 2933) of
those on the waiting list for a heart transplant died before an organ became available. See United
Network for Organ Sharing, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 1996 ANN. REP. U.S. SCI.
REGISTRY TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS & ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK 280
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]. By 1996, this percentage had fallen to 20% (746 out of 3698). See United
Network for Organ Sharing, Waiting List (visited Dec. 11, 1997) <http://207.87.26.13/Framedefault.
asp?Category-Newsdata>.
4. See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY
(1971).
5. See id. at 145-55.
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when the blood was donated rather than purchased.6 One might infer that in
the absence of effective tests for diseases like hepatitis, donated blood is of
better quality because donors who are not paid for their blood have no
incentive to conceal their illnesses. An appeal to altruism may also tend to
attract people with healthier habits. Furthermore, offering financial incentives
for blood could cause those in need of money to take unnecessary risks. They
might, for example, supply too frequently, thereby endangering their own
health.
Robert Solow found Titmuss's book to be "a devastating and
unanswerable indictment of the American system as inferior to the British in
efficiency, morality, and attractiveness. 7 Indeed, Solow felt that the benefit of
Titmuss's work was such that "[e]ven if Titmuss fails to produce a convincing
explanation of the success of the British system and the failure of the
American, the facts themselves pose more of a challenge to 'economists' than
to him."8
Arrow considered Titmuss's evidence to be a "powerful indictment of the
efficiency of blood-giving in the United States."9 Arrow noted that the basic
problem associated with procuring blood had parallels in the trade of other
commodities and services in which the buyer is not in a position to know what
he is buying, whereas the seller knows what he is selling.'" The market for
used cars is a good example. In cases characterized by this type of asymmetry
of information, "[s]ome alternative system for determining quality and
providing assurance to buyers is needed."'" Where the price system breaks
down, "ethical behavior can be regarded as a socially desirable institution
which facilitates the achievement of economic efficiency."' 2
However, Arrow and Titmuss disagreed fundamentally over how
individuals respond when markets are introduced. Titmuss believed that the
price incentives offered by markets would drive out altruism and cause
donative supply to wither. 3 For example, if organs came to be viewed
generally as a commodity, and if some families refused to treat their loved
ones' organs in this fashion, they might choose neither to donate nor to sell
the organs. In short, Titmuss believed that either a market or donation is
possible, but not both, and that the introduction of a market would deny
people "the right to give."' 4
Arrow found Titmuss's argument wanting on theoretical and empirical
grounds. Arrow could "find no evidence for the existence" of such a
6. See id. at 145, 154-55 (showing that the rate of transfusion-caused hepatitis was far higher in
the United States than in Britain at a time when the British blood supply system was comj~letely non-
commercial whereas the U.S. system was largely commercial).
7. Robert M. Solow, Blood and Thunder, 80 YALE L.J. 1696, 1696 (1971).
8. Id. at 1705-06.
9. Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, I PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 352 (1972).
10. See id. at 354.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See TITMUSS, supra note 4, at 198.
14. Id. at 237.
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phenomenon, and he stated that, "[i]n any case[,] the empirical evidence can
only be made meaningful with at least a minimum of theoretical analysis."' 5
Arrow queried, "Why should it be that the creation of a market in blood would
decrease the altruism embodied in giving blood? I do not find any clear
answer in Titmuss."'
16
Arrow's statement is consistent with the view that altruism is a limited
resource that must be rationed. 7 According to this view, altruistic and non-
altruistic individuals respond to different incentives, and, furthermore, the
ability to substitute the utility of selling for that of donating is small, perhaps
zero. Altruistic individuals supply when sufficiently exhorted; non-altruistic
individuals supply when offered a satisfactory financial incentive. Neither
responds to the other's incentives. For Arrow, therefore, the introduction of a
market elicits new supply from non-altruists, all the while leaving the donative
supply from altruists unchanged. Likewise, reducing efforts to gain donations
does not increase market supply.
Other proponents of markets, reacting to Titmuss, counter with ethical and
non-ethical arguments of their own. They contend that it is unfair to deny the
poor the right to sell their tissue, which may be their only asset.'8 They point
out the irony of a system that prohibits the poor (or anyone else) from selling
their organs, but that cannot assure them a transplant at a price they can
afford.'9 Market supporters also contend that altruism is not the only way to
achieve high quality; for example, Kessel asserted that the problems with
safety and insufficient supply in the blood system were caused not by an
excess of commercialism in the system, but rather by a lack of
commercialism.2° The quality of blood could be improved, he argued, if strict
15. Arrow, supra note 9, at 350-51.
16. Id. at 350. For a response to Arrow, see D. COLLARD, ALTRUISM AND ECONOMY: A STUDY IN
NON-SELFISH ECONOMICS 147-50 (1978) (offering a simple model of voluntary donation that is
consistent with rational economic behavior and with Titmuss's concern for the larger issues in blood
donation).
17. In this regard, Solow cites a talk by Dennis Robertson. See Solow, supra note 7, at 1706
(citing Dennis H. Robertson, What Does the Economist Economize?, in ECONOMIC COMMENTARIES 147
(1956)). Robertson claimed that economists economize "love," by which Solow explains, "[Robertson]
meant that altruism is a scarce resource, and the business of economists is to find institutional
arrangements that will accomplish society's purposes without depending too much on disinterested
kindness." Id.
18. See, e.g., James E. MacDonald & E.K. Valentin, The Brave New World of Organ
Transplantation: Issues and Challenges from a Consumer Affairs Perspective, 22 J. CONSUMER AFF.
119, 127 (1988) ("'For the poor, the sale of bodily tissue may offer the only ... opportunity of breaking
out of the poverty cycle. My kidney is the only capital resource I still possess that can be marketed in
order to provide me with a chance of gaining access to educational and employment opportunities .... I
am far more able to sacrifice one kidney, rather than the continued sacrifice of what should be the most
productive years of my professional life."' (quoting Bernard M. Dickens, The Control of Living Body
Materials, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 142, 165 (1977) (quoting Larry Carter, who intended to sell one kidney
to fund a graduate education))) (alterations in original).
19. See, e.g., Marvin Brains, Transplantable Human Organs: Should Their Sale Be Authorized
by State Statute?, 3 AM. J.L. & MED. 183, 191 (1978).
20. See Reuben A. Kessel, Transfused Blood, Serum Hepatitis, and the Coase Theorem, 17 J.L.
& ECON. 265, 267 (1974).
Yale Journal on Regulation
liability rules were applied to procurers of blood.2 Strict liability would give
procurers strong financial incentives to develop techniques to screen their
suppliers carefully.22
In the main, however, the quality issue seems of little concern to those
who favor markets, and the lines in the debate over commercialism are thus
more clearly drawn: Those who favor a market in human organs argue
primarily on efficiency grounds, contending that payments to donors would
elicit greater supply, thereby reducing shortages;23 those who oppose a market
argue on grounds of ethical principle rather than efficiency.
2 4
II. Two Economic Models of the Effect of Banning a Market
The proper domain of the market is, of course, of great and longstanding
concern to economists. Some economists have opposed all restrictions on
alienability, citing reasons of personal liberty and efficiency. Others have
agreed to some restrictions on markets on the non-consequentialist grounds
that people have a "right not to act out of desperation."26 Still others justify
restrictions on alienability in cases of market failure.27
Where economists agree nearly universally is on the theory that market
bans must necessarily cause shortages and other inefficiencies.2" Section II.A.
presents the conventional price-control model of market-inalienability that
leads to this result; Section II.B. offers an alternative, more plausible model
that yields a different result.
21. See id. at 282-84.
22. See id.
23. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 3.
24. See, e.g., Brains, supra note 19, at 192 (summarizing and responding to "ethical objections").
25. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 970 (1985);
Elizabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323
(1978).
26. ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE GREAT TRADEOFF 19 (1975).
27. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 931 (1985). A striking example of
one such market failure was offered by Titmuss, who opposed a market in blood out of a concern that
purchased blood was likely to be inferior to donated blood in quality. See supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 3; ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD,
MICROECONOMICs 298-301 (1989) (presenting a simple model of the market ban on kidneys and the
resulting social welfare loss); L. Dwayne Barney, Jr. & R. Larry Reynolds, An Economic Analysis of
Transplant Organs, 17 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 12, 20 (1989) (concluding that "the current system of
volunteerism may result in a price for a transplant operation which exceeds what it would be under a
strong market approach"); David L. Kaserman & A.H. Barnett, An Economic Analysis of Transplant
Organs: A Comment and Extension, 19 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 57, 63 (1991) (concluding that "[we] can
safely say that [we] have never encountered a single policy that is more at odds with the public welfare
than is the current organ procurement policy").
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A. The Conventional Economic Analysis of the Effect of Banning a Market
Economists have analyzed market bans using the standard price-control
model with the banned good's price set at zero. This model implies
unequivocally that market-inalienable goods and services will be in short
supply. The model's demonstration of welfare losses to banning markets
depends critically on the following assumptions:
a. The quality of goods procured is the same whether the goods are
sold or donated;
b. Altruists will continue to donate after a market is introduced;
c. When markets are banned, not only is the cost of the good zero,
but no other costs are required to procure the donated good;






8000 32,000 Annual Number
of Kidneys
Figure 1 shows Pindyck and Rubinfeld's analysis of the current organ
procurement system.29 The supply of cadaveric kidneys under the current
donative system is shown as SDON and is fixed at 8000. Market supply, SMK7. is
shown to rise with price, intersecting demand to the right of 8000 kidneys. A
command system that made all organs the property of the state could procure
29. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 28, at 300. Barney & Reynolds, supra note 28, and
Kaserman & Barnett, supra note 28, present more complex models that incorporate the derived demand
for physician services and kidneys. The implications of their analyses are similar to those of Pindyck and
Rubinfeld's simpler model; the critique presented in this paper is equally applicable to the more complex
models.
Yale Journal on Regulation
all medically suitable organs, ScOM, the number of which is variously
estimated at about 32,000 kidneys per year.3"
The model implies that a market in organs would ease shortages by
increasing supply. In addition, absent a market, a welfare loss might occur if,
in order to obtain a share of the fixed supply, consumers engage in activities
that they would not undertake in the absence of price controls. For example,
waiting in a queue to establish a property right to a price-controlled good like
gasoline dissipates its value. That is, the procurement effort associated with
waiting in line for gasoline does not increase the total supply of the fuel; the
activity merely allocates a fixed supply and, therefore, from a social
perspective, might be viewed as wasteful. If, when markets are banned,
procurers engage in activities that would be unnecessary in a market, then a
similar welfare loss will occur as the good's rent is dissipated.
To summarize, the economic basis for opposing a ban on a market is that
it may cause a variety of inefficiencies, including (i) shortages and
(ii) a dissipation of the rents that otherwise would accrue to the owners. Some
also oppose the ban on the basis that it may result in a redistribution of some
of the good's rent from suppliers to consumers or intermediaries.3'
Each of the four assumptions of the above model is debatable. First, the
concern that markets will endanger quality, originally raised by Titmuss and
later supported by Arrow,32 remains: For example, for technical reasons, it is
still difficult or impossible to test donors for conditions such as HIV. Second,
altruistic donors may withdraw their supply when markets are introduced. If
altruists do withdraw their supply, then the market supply curve in Figure 1
will shift left.33
But most open to challenge are assumptions (c) and (d) and their
implications. The conventional price-control analysis ignores efforts, other
than raising price, that are undertaken to elicit supply. It assumes that people
simply line up to donate and that the cost of procuring the donated good is
zero. The analysis presumes that people either are or are not altruistic, and that
public education efforts to inform them of the need for the donated good or to
exhort them to donate are unnecessary. According to this view, a system
reliant on donation resembles either an authoritarian system in which people
30. The National Task Force on Organ Transplantation estimated that 20,000 cadaveric donors
are available annually, each with two kidneys; this number is reduced by a 20% "discard factor" to
account for kidneys procured but not transplanted. See TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 35
(1986). But see R.W. Evans et al., The Potential Supply of Organ Donors: An Assessment of the
Efficiency of Organ Procurement Efforts in the US., 267 JAMA 239, 242 (1992) (estimating the number
of potential, suitable cadaveric donors at between 6900 and 10,700, which would yield between 13,800
and 21,400 kidneys).
31. See, e.g., Emanuel D. Thome, Tissue Transplants: The Dilemma of the Body's Growing
Value, PUB. INTEREST, winter 1990, at 37 (discussing the possibility that other factors of production,
such as physicians and hospitals, might expropriate a donated organ's rent).
32. See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
33. Even if altruists withdrew their supply upon the introduction of a market, the resultant
welfare loss would be less than the welfare loss under a market ban. See infra Section II.C.
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are required to donate at zero price, or a culture in which donation expresses
social mores.
The fact is, to secure donations of organs, procurers must urge, coax,
cajole, and otherwise exhort next-of-kin of potential donors to donate and
hospital staff and physicians to refer potential donors. These donations do not
come without cost. After examining the process of procuring market-
inalienable goods in the following section, I argue that the activities of urging,
pleading, coaxing, and cajoling ought to be viewed as a production process
that is an alternative to the market.
B. Procuring Market-Inalienable Organs by Exhorting Donors
Let the term "exhortation" be used to describe the non-price efforts used
to secure market-inalienable goods and services. Exhortation includes efforts
to inform and persuade all participants in the donative system who cannot be
paid for what they supply. In the case of organs, exhortation includes efforts
by procurement organizations to get next-of-kin to donate organs, and also
efforts directed at physicians and hospital staff to identify, without
remuneration, potential donors.
Clearly, markets and command systems also rely on exhortation in the
form of advertising, social marketing, and public education. In fact,
exhortation is often used to secure what can be neither bought nor
commanded, such as loyalty, friendship, devotion, and even love. A
wonderful illustration of the need for exhortation (or intimidation), even in the
face of apparently complete property rights, is given by Barzel in his
explanation of how it was possible for slaves in the antebellum South to
accumulate assets with which to buy their freedom.34 Even under command
systems, exhortation in the form of moral suasion is very much a feature of
organization.35
34. See YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 105-13 (2d ed. 1997). The
puzzle is: How could a slave have obtained the assets with which to buy his freedom when the
slaveowner had complete property rights both to the slave and to any assets the slave could accumulate?
Barzel's answer is that the slaveowner still had to spend money to enforce his property right over the
slave. That is, the owner had to hire a guard to exhort (i.e., intimidate) the slave. This "transaction" cost
drove a wedge between what the slave could have earned had he been able to work for himself and his
net value to the owner. Barzel argues that "[t]he need for supervision and the desire to economize on its
cost made ownership of slaves less than fully delineated" and that "[s]laves were able to capture some of
these undelineated rights-in this case rights to themselves." Id. at 110.
Because estimation of a slave's potential output was subject to error, and because setting
production quotas too high would destroy the slave, it was in the slaveowner's self-interest to set quotas
below what a slave could actually produce. Barzel suggests that it was also in the slaveowner's self-
interest to permit slaves to own and accumulate some of the excess production above the quota. Thus,
"partly due to skills in feigning inability, on the one hand, and to activities such as fishing, on the other,
as well as the luck of having errors made in their favor," some slaves were eventually able to buy their
own contracts. Id.
Barzel concludes that wherever there are transactions costs, "rights to assets will never be perfectly
delineated." Id. at 4.
35. For a description of Stakhanovism, a 1930s program in the Soviet Union which was aimed at
achieving increased worker productivity through exhortation, see LEWIS H. SIEGELBAUM,
STAKHANOVISM AND THE POLITICS OF PRODUCTIVITY IN THE U.S.S.R., 1935-1941 (1988). In the 1960s
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The donative system's reliance on exhortation is especially striking in that
it is the sole means of procuring market-inalienable goods. Moreover, for
some market-inalienable goods, possibly including organs, the number of
goods an agency procures will be directly related to the exhortation effort it
expends.36 The costly exhortation activities used by procurement agencies to
secure supply ought to be viewed, therefore, as a production technique that is
an alternative to expropriating or paying donors directly. The price control
model in Figure 1 depicts donative supply, SOoN, as fixed, and thus fails to
reflect the cost of the effort to procure donations when a market is banned.
FIGURE 2




8000 32,000 Annual Number
of Kidneys
To depict donative supply more realistically, the price control model is
modified in Figure 2 to show donative supply, SOoN, rising with expenditures
on procurement effort.37 While the relative positions and shapes of SOoN and
SMKT shown in Figure 2 are drawn for illustrative purposes only and are in fact
and 1970s, a great debate took place in the socialist world over the efficiency of providing "moral
incentives" to workers. See generally ROBERT M. BERNARDO, THE THEORY OF MORAL INCENTIVES IN
CUBA (1971). Moral incentives are a type of exhortation to be contrasted with material incentives and
command. In Cuba, for example, Che Guevara argued that the use of moral incentives could be a partial
substitute for intense central planning. See id. at viii. Similar attempts were made in China and North
Korea. See id. at vii-ix. For a comparison of the effectiveness of social marketing campaigns and
regulation (i.e., exhortation versus command), see Robert S. Adler & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or
Command: Are Education Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation?, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 159
(1984).
36. See Emanuel D. Thorne, The Cost of Procuring Market-Inalienable Human Organs, 10 J.
REG. ECON. 191, 198 (1996).
37. Note that in this figure and in all figures describing exhortation, the price on the y-axis
should not be interpreted as the dollar value of the benefits to the supplier but, rather, as the amount the
procurer must expend to get the supply and the amount demanders are willing to pay.
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unknown, the essential point is that the supply of donations is shown to
increase with increased expenditure (unlike SDONr in Figure 1).38
The effect of banning a market, then, depends on two supply curves that
are both rising in response to increasing expenditures: the donative supply
responding to increased exhortation effort and the market supply responding
to rising price. Which scenario garners the most organs for a given
expenditure (i.e., which is the rightmost supply curve) becomes an empirical
issue.
Organs belong to a class of goods that differ from conventional goods in
that people respond to campaigns exhorting them to donate when markets are
banned. As indicated in Section II.A., the conventional view of what happens
when the price of a good like gasoline is fixed below market equilibrium is
that competition for the good encourages consumers to undertake wasteful
activities, such as queuing, which activities would be unnecessary in a market.
However, the "wasteful" activity undertaken by demanders of organs includes
exhorting suppliers to donate. Whereas exhorting suppliers to donate a good
like gasoline is not likely to yield much success, individuals do respond to
pleas for donations of human organs. Thus, exhorting suppliers to donate a
market-inalienable good like an organ may not merely redistribute supply; it
may also enlarge supply, even beyond what a market would generate.
All else being equal, exhortation will produce a supply that exceeds the
market supply when the cost to procurers of the supply garnered by
exhortation is lower than the cost of market-generated supply. How can this
happen? Part of the answer lies in what motivates donors to respond to
exhortation campaigns. Donors respond to exhortation for reasons that may
include a sense of duty, responsibility, love, and other psychological rewards.
Exhortation by procurers can be thought to supply these donors with
information. Because information elicits supply, the number of organs
supplied under a market ban should depend on the level of effort expended on
exhortation.
Another part of the answer depends on the behavior of procurers designed
to appeal to these motives. The focus here is not on the efficiency of donor
motives (i.e., altruism versus self-interest) but rather on the efficiency of the
actions of procurers that appeal to these motives (i.e., exhortation versus
payments).
The nature of the donative system and its reliance on exhortation is
complex, but for the purposes of this theoretical Essay it is sufficient to accept
that: (1) Exhortation is an important feature of the donative system;
(2) Considerable sums of money are spent exhorting people to give; and
(3) For some goods and services, people respond to exhortation by donating.
Whatever the motive for donation, exhortation elicits supply, and there is no
38. Siov and SMKT are both shown in Figure 2 as intersecting the y-axis above the origin on the
assumption that there is some minimal disutility to supplying an organ that must be overcome either by
price or exhortation. See discussion infra Appendix.
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theoretical basis for asserting that the supply generated by exhortation must be
smaller than market supply.39
C. Equilibrium Supply Under a Market Ban
The price-control model predicts unequivocally that a market ban will
cause a shortage of organs and a dissipation of rents. By contrast, in the
modified price-control model that incorporates the features of a donative
system, a market ban does not necessarily decrease supply. Whether
equilibrium in the latter will reflect a greater or lesser supply depends on
several features of the industry's structure, including the cost of paying
suppliers in relation to the cost of exhorting them to donate, the nonprofit/for-
profit status of the procuring organizations, and the objectives of these
organizations. Perhaps most importantly, the equilibrium supply of organs
will depend on how the market and donative sectors interact-that is, on
whether the existence of a market will drive out donations.4°
The price-control model presented earlier assumes that people would
continue to donate if a market in organs emerged. According to that model,
newly-permitted payments for organs would serve to elicit a supply over and
above the donated supply, thereby increasing the aggregate supply.41 In the
following two subsections, I show that regardless of how one conceives of
donor behavior, there are conditions under which a market ban might, as a
theoretical matter, enlarge supply.
1. Introducing a Market Will Cause Donations to Wither (Titmuss)
The Titmuss scenario assumes that the introduction of a market will cause
donations to wither completely.42 According to this view, all individuals who
supply when exhorted would prefer to sell at any price. Thus aggregate supply
is either the market supply or the exhortation supply.
At present, organ procurement takes place through government-
designated nonprofit organizations, each of which, in effect, owns the sole
franchise to procure in its region. In this case, where an agency is the sole
owner in its region but must compete with other regional sole owners, each
agency will produce at the private property equilibrium. Thus, if the marginal
cost of exhortation (MCExH in Figure 3) is greater than the marginal cost of
market supply (MCMKT in Figure 3), the equilibrium supply of organs under
exhortation (Point 2) will be smaller than the market supply (Point 4).
39. For donors who donate because exhortation provides them with utility that they could have
purchased, the marginal cost of procurement by exhortation must exceed the market cost. But the supply
curve for donation will be the average cost of exhortation, because market-inalienable goods are
common property. See discussion infra Part III. Thus, even if the marginal cost of exhortation exceeds
the market cost, the average cost of exhortation could still be lower than the market cost.
40. See infra Appendix (using a model of individual organ supplier behavior to identify the
conditions under which those who now donate will cease to do so once a market is established).
41. Seesuprap. 7 fig.I (Sr).
42. See TITMUSS, supra note 4, at 198-99.
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However, if the marginal cost of exhortation (MC2ExH in Figure 3) is less than
the marginal cost of market supply, the equilibrium supply of organs under
exhortation (Point 6) will be greater than the market supply. If each nonprofit
agency chooses to maximize its output instead of its surplus, then it will
exhort at Point 7 in Figure 3, where AC'ExH, the average cost corresponding to
MC/ExH, intersects demand. If it uses donated funds in its procurement efforts,










Next, consider the case in which a single nonprofit agency is the sole
owner in every region and has, therefore, a procurement monopoly. If the
marginal cost of exhortation is greater than the marginal cost of market
supply, the equilibrium supply of organs under exhortation (Point 1 in
Figure 3) will be smaller than the market supply by a monopolist (Point 3). If
the marginal cost of exhortation is less than the marginal cost of market
supply, the equilibrium supply of organs under exhortation (Point 5) will be
greater than the market supply.
If the nonprofit monopolist chooses to maximize its output instead of its
surplus, then it will exhort at Point 7 in Figure 3, where demand equals the
average cost of exhortation. If it has an excess of funds, then the equilibrium
supply will be greater than the supply at Point 7. Once again, the equilibrium
supply under exhortation will exceed the market supply if the marginal cost of
exhortation is less than the marginal cost of market supply.
2. Introducing a Market Will Not Affect Donations (Arrow)
The following assumptions are consistent with. Arrow's critique of
Titmuss: (1) Individuals who supply when exhorted would not respond to
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financial incentives, and individuals who supply when offered a satisfactory
financial incentive would not respond to exhortation; (2) Markets would elicit
new supply, leaving the exhortation supply unchanged; and (3) Reducing
exhortation effort would not increase market supply, and banning a market
would not increase donations.
Where a market and a donative sector coexist, total equilibrium supply
will depend on the extent to which the industry is competitive. Since the two
sectors are independent, the performance of the market presumably will not
affect the marginal cost of exhortation. And once again it is assumed that
nonprofit organizations organize the donative sector.
Suppose one monopolist procures in both sectors. In this hypothetical
situation, such an organ procurer might be a monopolist with two plants using
different technologies with different cost structures to produce a homogeneous
product (i.e., organs). One plant relies on exhortation; the other relies on the
market. The monopolist must decide: (1) how many organs to procure
altogether and the price to charge; and (2) how to allocate procurement
between the market and donative sectors. The curve in Figure 4 representing
the marginal cost of procurement for the monopolist (MC) will be the
horizontal sum of the curve representing the marginal cost of procurement by
exhortation (MCxH) and the curve representing the marginal cost of
procurement by a market (MCMKT). MC represents the cost of procuring an
additional organ at each level of procurement when procurement by means of
exhortation and payment are both available to the procurer. Figure 4 shows
MC as kinked when MCExH is initially less than MCMKT.
FIGURE 4
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A surplus-maximizing monopolistic nonprofit will maximize surplus
when marginal revenue (MR) equals MC. This equilibrium condition will set
both the total quantity procured and the price. If MCExH equals MCMKT when
MR equals MC, then the for-profit monopoly maximizes profits where MR
equals MCExH equals MCMKT. In that case, MR intersects MC above the kink
(not shown) and introducing a market will increase supply. However, if MCXH
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is less than MCMKr when MR equals MC, then the for-profit monopolist
maximizes profits where MR equals MCExH. This appears in Figure 4 as Point
A, where MR intersects MC below the kink. In such a case, introducing a
market will not increase supply. If MCEx, exceeds MCMKT at all procurement
levels, then introducing a market will always increase supply.
Thus, the effect on supply of introducing a market depends on both the
nonprofit monopoly's level of exhortation and the location of the kink in the
MC curve relative to MR and demand. If the nonprofit chooses to procure at
the socially efficient level-i.e., at Point C, above the kink in the MC curve in
Figure 4-then introducing a market would increase supply; if the level of
exhortation is below the kink in Figure 4, then introducing a market would
have no effect on supply.
43
The analysis presented here and in the previous subsection shows that if
the marginal cost of market procurement is greater than or equal to the
marginal cost of exhortation (or, in some cases, the average cost of
exhortation), then conditions exist under which a market ban need not reduce
supply (at least theoretically). On the other hand, if both the marginal and
average costs of exhortation exceed the marginal cost of procurement under a
market, then the model suggests that a market ban will reduce supply.
As the next part demonstrates, an additional complication of the donative
system's reliance on exhortation is the fact that market-inalienable goods are
in essential ways common property, making the exhortation of donors much
like "fishing" from a common pool. As will be seen, the appropriate supply of
exhorted market-inalienable goods is the supply from the commons.
III. The Common Property Nature of Human Organs
Having shown in Part II that supply elicited by exhortation can exceed
market supply, I now show that, because of the attributes of market-
inalienability, exhortation-generated supply might be even further enlarged.
This result occurs because, as I argue in Section III.A., market-inalienable
goods are fundamentally like common property, such that exhorting donations
of market-inalienable goods is analogous to fishing in common property
waters. I present the economic analysis of common property in Section III.B.
and apply the analysis to the supply of market-inalienable goods in Section
III.C.
A. Market-Inalienable Goods as Common Property
When man-made restrictions on property rights limit the right to sell a
good but do not assign the rights to the economic value that the resource can
earn, then a mixture of private and common property rights obtains. While
43. An output-maximizing nonprofit monopolist will allocate procurement between the two
plants by setting AC~N = ACKT. Total supply will correspond to output at the intersection of demand
and the sum ofACyn and ACMKT (not shown in Figure 4).
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individuals are unable to sell market-inalienable goods, they are free to donate
such goods, and, if they choose to donate, they can also choose the recipient
of the donation.
A market-inalienable good like a human organ is not naturally a common-
property good because completely defined property rights could be
established without difficulty. Unlike with common-property goods such as
fish, air, and minerals, no technical difficulties impede barring free riders from
enjoying the use of human organs, nor is the organ's use characterized by
indivisibilities. In short, market-inalienable goods could be treated as private
goods in the United States.
However, because the rights to the economic value of market-inalienable
goods are unassigned, banning a market makes market-inalienable goods
common property in a fundamental way. Because a market-inalienable good
(and its economic value) will belong not to the owner but to the party to whom
the good is donated, the good appears as common property from the
perspective of those who want it. Someone who wants the market-inalienable
good will engage in activities to obtain it that are remarkably similar to the
activities of someone "fishing" in common property waters. A fisherman will
invest his labor and capital to catch a fish by dangling a worm before it. If the
fisherman is successful, the fish itself is free to him even though the fishing
effort may have been costly. Likewise, someone wishing to obtain a market-
inalienable good has every incentive to engage in costly exhortation/"fishing"
activities that, if successful, will yield him the good for free. In short, by
leaving the rights to a good's economic value unassigned, banning a market in
that good allows everyone access to its free value and, in effect, creates a man-
made common property resource."a
This notion that banning a market creates, in effect, a common property
resource is an extension of Cheung's insight that whenever a price is fixed
below the market price, a common-property rent (non-exclusive income, in his
terminology) is created.45 It would appear, then, that private property, price
44. The class of goods and services that may be considered to have common-property attributes
because they are market-inalienable is, in fact, quite broad. The property rights to those goods and
services may be restricted in ways that make them either wholly or partially market-inalienable. Sexual
favors and basketball talent are both illustrations of market-inalienable resources in that the resource's
owner has only a limited, right to transact. Our sexual rights are limited by legislation that bans
prostitution. Similarly, a talented amateur basketball player's rights are limited by the arrangement
among colleges that permits only "donations" of talent, not sales. While in neither of these two cases can
the owner legally be forced to supply the resource for free, the owner does not have the right to sell the
valuable service. In both cases, the owner retains the right to give the resource away. More importantly,
anyone who wants the resource from the owner must exhort the owner to get it.
45. Cheung writes:
How does price control lead to non-exclusive income? For illustration let us suppose that a
tenement's constant monthly market rent of $100 is reduced by law to a controlled rent of
$60. Assume for simplicity that this control will last to perpetuity. Who is granted the
exclusive right to the $40 of rental income taken from the landlord?... It would be relatively
simple to . . . delineate and assign exclusive-use rights to a portion of the tenement to the
tenant. That is, instead of taking $40 from the landlord, part of the physical area of the
tenement might be assigned exclusively to the tenant so that the landlord's remaining portion
would yield a monthly market rent of $60 .... However, when the law governing the control
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control, market-inalienability, and common property really comprise varying
degrees of property rights to a resource. Between private property goods at
one end of the property rights spectrum and common property goods at the
other are partial price-control and market-inalienable goods.46
The effort expended to establish a property right by waiting in a queue is
seen by Barzel as the source of the dissipation of the value of a price-
controlled good like gasoline.47 Barzel's analysis of the dissipation of the
price-controlled good's rent is an application and extension of Cheung's
insight into the common property nature of this rent. From the perspective of
Barzel, Cheung, and others writing about dissipation by rationing-by-waiting,
or rent-seeking, the dissipation of producer surplus by these efforts does not
increase supply. All that rent-seeking accomplishes is the dissipation of the
rent through activities that merely allocate a fixed supply. However,
proceeding from Barzel's and Cheung's analyses of partial price controls, I
argue here that exhortation-type rent-seeking need not dissipate producer
surplus if, by these efforts, supply is increased.
avoids making the tenant a part owner of the tenement, the assignment of exclusive ights to
the portion of rent diverted from the landlord is no simple matter .... [C]ompetition among
contracting parties for the resultant non-exclusive income will tend to dissipate it.
Steven N.S. Cheung, A Theory of Price Control, 17 J.L. & EcON. 53, 60-61 (1974).
46. Exhorting a donation of a partially or wholly market-inalienable good is different from
exhorting a donation of a good that is completely private. With a private good, people can choose not
only to whom to donate, but whether to donate at all. Norman Shore has brought to my attention an
interesting class of goods that regulation makes into common property when such regulation requires
that the goods be donated but does not specify the recipient of the donation. In such circumstances,
people cannot keep the goods, because they must donate; their options are limited to the "to whom to
give" question. A tax system, for example, creates goods with common property attributes much like
market-inalienable goods. An early instance is given in The Bible when God requires a tithe to be paid to
the Levites. See, e.g., Numbers 18:21. God does not specify to which Levite the tithe must be paid (e.g.,
the neighborhood Levite), so the tax apparently can be paid to the Levite of one's choice. While the
economic value of the tax no longer belongs to the taxpayer, it does not belong to a particular Levite
until the tithe is handed over to him. Until then, it belongs to no one. The fact that the tithe is unassigned
could lead Levites to dissipate its value by making expenditures to exhort taxpayers to tithe to them. In
our day, a similar dissipation of grants from charitable foundations may occur. To maintain their
favorable tax status, charitable foundations are required by the I.R.S. to disburse their funds. See I.R.C. §
4942 (1994). In effect, as with the tithe to the Levites, the foundations no longer have a right to the
money-only the right to direct it. And as long as the funds are unassigned, potential grantees have
every incentive to engage in activities that have the effect of dissipating the grants such as exhortation.
47. More generally, Barzel argues:
A commodity announced to be free is effectively placed in the public domain and is of no
value until ownership is established. Establishing ownership requires that an individual fulfill
certain criteria; in the example here, the criterion is to spend five minutes in the queue.
Acquisition of the commodity consumes real resources over and above the resources used in
production. In this example, ownership is established over one already produced unit of the
commodity. Methods differ from case to case, but whatever the method by which rights are
acquired, it may generally be stated that resources must be spent to gain possession of
commodities in the public domain, and that individual maximization applies here no less than
to conventional exchange.
BARZEL, supra note 34, at 18.
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B. The General Common Property Problem
As property rights to the commons are undefined and access to it is non-
exclusive, ownership of the commons' resources is governed by the rule of
capture. Under this rule, parties have exclusive rights to the resources that
they manage to procure, resources that are free to them. 8
Open access to a common property, such as the ocean, causes a well-
analyzed congestion externality, first described by Scott Gordon.4 ' The
externality can be modeled in a simple static one-period model in which each
fisherman's cost function depends not only on his level of production, but also
on the aggregate level of production of the others fishing in the ocean. With
average cost depending on aggregate ocean output, the marginal fishing of one
fisherman imposes additional costs on all infra-marginal fishing." This simple
example illustrates why common property resources are used inefficiently.
Individuals know that what they do not extract will be extracted by rivals, so
they have little incentive to forego current extraction in favor of future
extraction. In addition, individuals have little incentive to coordinate their
efforts, as is true where traditional public goods are concerned. Consequently,
48. The term "free" is used to indicate that the resource itself has no cost. Naturally, costs may be
incurred in capturing a free resource.
49. See H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery,
17 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954). For a modem treatment of the common property externality, see RICHARD
CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS (1986).
50. The essence of a common property good can be appreciated by comparing it to a private
good. Consider the economics of harvesting fish in a privately owned lake. The owner of a lake wishes
to hire labor to fish and is willing to pay them the prevailing wage, say, the wage paid by McDonald's. If
the owner expects the value of the fish caught by the first fisherman to exceed the wage, the lake owner
will hire him. The owner will pocket the difference between the wage he paid the fisherman and the
value of his catch. The value of the fish caught by the next fisherman to be hired will be less than the
value of the first angler's catch because of congestion in the lake. However, as long as the value of the
fish caught by each additional fisherman exceeds the wage he is paid, the owner will hire the additional
fisherman. When the value of the fish caught by the nth fisherman drops below the wage he is paid, the
owner of the lake will stop hiring.
This is the optimal level of fishing. Any additional fishing would be inefficient because the
fisherman could produce greater value at an activity other than fishing. At the optimal level of fishing,
the excess of the value of output over wage costs is the profit earned by the owner of the lake. This profit
is the value of the fish.
Suppose now that the lake is made common property and that everyone has free access to the fish
in it. If the existing fishermen can somehow collude and keep new workers from entering the fishing
grounds, then they will continue to fish at the same level they did when the lake was private property-
which has already been shown to be the efficient level. The fishermen will now pocket the profit that the
owner received when the lake was private, increasing their earnings above the prevailing wage they
earned when the lake was private. If there is open access to the lake, however, the higher earnings
available to fishermen will attract workers who, in alternative work, can earn only the prevailing wage.
If new entrants cannot be denied free access to the lake, then more fishermen will fish, which will result
in inefficient overfishing (in comparison to the private property case). Once again, this inefficiency
results from fishing at a level at which the value of the fishermen's catch is less than the prevailing wage
that McDonald's might pay them.
When there is unlimited free access to the lake, we have the common property problem with its
well-known associated "tragedy." The lake is overfished; that is, it is fished beyond the level it would be
if the lake were privately owned. This overfishing is financed by the value of the fish, which, in the
private property case, was profit earned by the lake's owner.
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people underinvest in renewing the resource and in developing information
that would benefit all producers.
To apply this analysis to the procurement of human organs, consider the
agencies that procure and distribute the organs-the middlemen in the
transplantation process. Suppose the organ procurement industry consists of a
given number of profit-maximizing organ procurers, each with free access to a
common-property "fishing ground" containing an exogenously fixed number
of individuals capable of supplying organs. Each organ procurer combines a
common-property resource-the organ-with its labor-exhortation-to
produce a transplantable organ as output. With the size of the potential pool of
organs fixed at S (the number of brain-dead cadavers, or the size of the
population if we were to allow live donation), the total number of organs
procured by all the organ procurers, Q, depends on the size of the total
procurement effort, E, and on S. The aggregate production function is
Q = Q(E,S). Let QE and Qs represent the derivatives with respect to E and S,
and QEE the second derivative with respect to E; we expect Q,>O, Qs>O, and
QEE<O.
The common property externality is introduced by allowing procurer i's
cost to depend on aggregate procurement by the others in the region as well as
on its own procurement, q'.
If the cost function for the representative agency takes the form
C(q',Q,S) = q' A(Q,S) (1)
where A(Q,S) is the unit or average cost function for each firm in the region,
then the well-known equilibrium condition is
P = (1/n)MC + [(n - l)/n]AC (2)
where P is the exogenously determined price of output,5' and MC and AC are
the industry marginal and average costs of exhortation, respectively. 2
51. While there might not be a market price for the market-inalienable good if procurers are not
allowed to sell the good, procurers will at least be able to charge a reasonable fee reflecting their
expenses. Moreover, a market-inalienable good like a human organ is an input into a process that results
in a final good-a transplanted organ-for which there may be no limitation on price. Thus, for this
thought experiment, the price P can be viewed either as a procurer's allowable reimbursable expenses or
as that part of the price of the final good that reflects the value added by the market-inalienable good.
52. Organ procurer i's problem is to maximize his profit, T, with respect to q'
Maximize , = q'[P -A(QS)], (3)
where q'O and Q = Eq S. The procurement agency's optimal quantity of procurement must satisfy the
first-order condition
d r/dq' = 0 = P - qAQ(Q,S) - A(Q,S). (4)
Equation (4) can be rewritten as
P = q'AQ(Q,S) + A(Q,S). (5)
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Equation (2) shows that the equilibrium price of output, P, is the weighted
sum of the marginal and average costs of total regional procurement. In the
case of a sole organ procurer,53 n = 1, so the second term of Equation (2) is
zero, and the quantity of organs procured is such that the price of output
equals the sole procurer's marginal cost of procuring organs. This is Point A
in Figure 5. As the number of organ procurers grows large, however, the
weight of the first term approaches zero while that of the second term
approaches one. In the extreme, as n becomes very large, procurement efforts
will increase until the average cost of output for all procurers in the region
equals the output price of an organ. This is Point B in Figure 5.
Because agency i's costs depend on aggregate procurement by other agencies in that region, Q, the
extent of the externality depends on the number of agencies involved. Since all agencies are assumed to
be identical with the same unit cost function, then q' = Qin for all i. Equation (5) can be rewritten to
show how the externality varies with n:
P = (Q/n)AQ(Q,S) + A(Q,S) (6)
or
P = (I/n)[A(Q,S) + QAQ(Q,S)] + [(n- l)/n]A(Q,S). (7)
For the industry as a whole, the cost function is
C(Q,S) = QA(Q,S), (8)
and the industry's marginal cost, MC, is
MC = dC/dQ = QAQ(Q,S) + A(Q,S). (9)
Rewriting Equation (7) as a function of MC and average cost, AC, yields the
equilibrium condition:
P =(1/n)MC + [(n-I)/n]A C. (10)
common-property
53. Although the sole supplier is the only supplier from this region (or lake), he is one of many
suppliers to the market and is, therefore, still a price taker and not a monopolist.
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When the resource is held in common, the entire rent that would accrue to
the owners of the resource if it were privately held is dissipated by inefficient
overproduction at a level at which marginal cost exceeds the price of output.
This is the standard result for common property resources.5 4
If a region contains many competing organ procurers, then, because of the
common property feature of market-inalienable goods, the supply of each
procurer will be represented by the average cost of exhortation. If there is
competition in each region, then the aggregate market supply from all regions
will be the sum of each competitor's average cost curve. Market equilibrium
occurs at Point A in Figure 6.
54. It is noteworthy that rent dissipation in the common property model is due solely to
congestion in the commons. If competitors in the commons were to use intimidation or other forms of
destructive competition to enforce a property right, such as cutting each other's fishing lines, then such
activities would raise average costs for each competitor. The aggregate market supply curve from all
commons would in that instance lie above the congestion-extemality only supply curve.








If, instead of many competitors in a region, there is only a single
exhorter-the sole owner-then the region's supply will be represented by the
sole owner's marginal cost of exhortation. If there is a sole owner in each
region, then the aggregate supply will be the sum of each sole owner's
marginal cost curve. If sole owners compete with other sole owners in other
regions, then market equilibrium will occur at Point B in Figure 6. This is the
competitive equilibrium for private property. However, if there is one
monopolist who is the sole owner in each region, then market equilibrium will
occur at Point C in Figure 6."
In sum, theory suggests and experience confirms that common property
will be overfished, depleting both current and future stocks. While the
commons of human tissue under a market ban may also be "overfished," as in
the standard model of the commons, the welfare implications of such a
circumstance defy the standard view. By encouraging the procurement of
tissue that otherwise would be discarded, treating human tissue as common
property may actually increase its supply, if inefficiently.56
55. The table below summarizes the relationships depicted in Figure 6 ("X" indicates an
impossible situation):
Market
Region (or Lake) Competition Monopoly
Many Competitors A X
Sole Owner B C
56. While current exhortation might actually enhance the effectiveness of future exhortation by
changing attitudes toward donation, I do not pursue that extension of the argument in this Essay.
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C. Equilibrium Supply of Common Property Market-Inalienable Goods
To observe the effect on equilibrium supply of reflecting average cost
rather than marginal cost in the supply curve of the market-inalienable good,
one must again consider how the market and donative sectors interact.
1. Introducing a Market Will Cause Donations to Wither (Titmuss)
Significantly, when many nonprofit procurers are competing in each
region and the organs' rents are treated as common property, equilibrium
supply will be determined by the intersection of demand and the average cost
of exhortation. Thus, nonprofit competitors, whether they are surplus-
maximizers or output-maximizers, will behave like for-profit competitors. The
equilibrium supply of organs under exhortation will occur where demand
equals the average cost of exhortation (Point 7 in Figure 3 where AC',XH, the
average cost corresponding to MC'ExH, intersects demand). Supply at this
equilibrium will be greater than the market supply as long as the average cost
of exhortation is lower than the marginal cost of the market (as depicted in
Figure 3). This result will hold even if the marginal cost of exhortation
exceeds that of the market.
2. Introducing a Market Will Not Affect Donations (Arrow)
If the entire industry is competitive (no sole owners in the donative
sector), then the supply curve in the donative sector, because of competition
for common property rents, will be the exhortation average cost curve. Let the
term "total supply curve" ("TSC') refer to the horizontal sum of the market
marginal cost curve and the exhortation average cost curve. The TSC in Figure
4 is shown to be to the right of MC. Equilibrium occurs at Point B where the
TSC intersects the demand curve. If Point B is above the kink, then
introducing markets will increase supply. If Point B is below the kink, then
introducing markets will not affect equilibrium supply.
The relationship between the marginal and average costs of exhortation
and the market cost is unknown. Which model of the interaction between the
market and donative sectors most accurately reflects the effect of the
introduction of a market is likewise unknown. While it is impossible to know
(in the absence of a market) what the market price would have been, the cost
of organs under the donative system does not seem prohibitive; on the
contrary, it is relatively low.57 But if exhortation is a cheap means of procuring
organs, if greater effort yields more organs, and if the effect of making organs
common property is to provide incentives to over-exhort people to donate,
how are the apparent shortages in organs to be understood?
57. Elsewhere I have examined the cost of efforts to procure market-inalienable organs and found
this cost to have been approximately $1650 per organ in 1990. See Thorne, supra note 36, at 196.
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There is, in fact, no over-exhortation of common-property organs because
regulatory policy grants regional monopolistic franchises to procurement
organizations. Consequently, property rights to the organs that are potentially
available in each region are assigned. But why is there under-exhortation of
organs? What are the obstacles to procuring a greater supply of market-
inalienable goods and more fully exploiting the donative system's efficiency?
Although in-depth investigation of these questions is beyond the scope of this
Essay, the difficulties associated with the organization of procurement efforts
by nonprofits and with reliance on exhortation should be considered to be
candidates for analysis.58
Conclusion
This investigation of the arrangements people make in the face of a
market ban-an extreme form of market failure-suggests that, in the case of
some goods and services, people donate in response to an alternative
production technique that relies on exhortation. Although different from
Titmuss's arguments in spirit and approach, this Essay supports his conclusion
that, at least theoretically, conditions exist under which regulation that makes
a good market-inalienable could produce a result that is both ethical and
efficient (in the sense that it need not cause a reduction in supply). While the
purpose of this Essay is to address the concerns of shortages and efficiency,
the present analysis may also have implications for debates concerning equity,
liberty, or "things important to personhood."59
The debate over the consequences of market-inalienability is highly
ideological, with little appeal to empirical evidence.6 ° The model of market-
inalienability put forth here provides a theoretical basis for a viable and
possibly efficient alternative to a market. Now that an alternative theory is
available, to assert that a market would increase supply will require empirical
support.
This Essay dods not constitute a broad attack on the efficiency of the
market. Its discussion of donative supply is confined to a sphere of activity
58. Cf Emanuel D. Thome, The Shortage of Market-Inalienable Human Organs: A
Consideration of "Non-Market" Failures, 57 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. (forthcoming July 1998) (analyzing
the obstacles to exploiting more fully the donative system's potential efficiencies).
59. Radin, supra note 1, at 1850.
60. But cf Thome, supra note 36, at 196 (noting that exhortation costs only $1650 per organ).
Operating without offering market incentives to organ donors, the organ transplant industry now
procures and transplants about 16,000 organs annually, see ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 65, at a
cost of more than $3 billion, see Thome, supra note 36, at 199. The $25 to $30 million annual cost of
procuring donations is a strikingly small fraction of the total cost of organ transplants. See id. Also,
increased expenditures appear to be associated with an increased yield of organs. This relationship can
be seen in two ways. First, a 50 percent increase in the aggregate real cost of acquiring organs between
1988 and 1990 was associated with a 13 percent rise in the total number of kidneys procured. See id. at
196. Furthermore, a cross-sectional analysis of organ procurement organizations showed that those
organizations that engaged in greater procurement effort attracted more donors. See id. at 196-99. In
short, procuring organs by donation appears to be cheap, and organ shortages may be due to inadequate
effort rather than the inefficiency of appeals to donor altruism. See generally Thore, supra note 58.
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where donation appears to work. In this specific context, people may behave
more efficiently under a market ban than under a free market.
What is the source of this efficiency? How can one characterize the
appropriate domain of market-inalienability? These, of course, are key
questions in the study not only of organ transplatation but also of other
ethically problematic activities. The analysis herein suggests that it might be
fruitful to define the sphere of ethically problematic activities for which
market bans do not reduce supply. This domain is often thought to comprise
goods and services supplied within the family or in other situations in which
ties of kinship obtain. Indeed, it can be argued that government programs such
as Social Security, which one can view as having commodified the care of
parents by children, are inefficient and should be replaced by non-
commodification and reliance on the family. We might also find that feelings
of kinship, as expressed through donation, extend past family to include
strangers. If such feelings of connectedness can be enhanced by activities that
promote civic virtues, then such efforts might be not only ethically and
politically desirable but also efficient. The task remains to specify the domain
of ethically problematic activities in which regulation by market ban might be
effective.
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Appendix
Interaction of Market and Donative Sectors:
Must Markets Disrupt Donations?
The theory of exhortation offers an insight into how organ donors might
respond if the market ban were lifted and they had the opportunity to sell. This
theory rests on three assumptions: (1) People experience disutility associated
with the removal of a dead loved one's organ; (2) The disutility can be
overcome either by the utility conferred by goods bought with financial
compensation or by the utility offered by donation; and (3) People vary with
respect to the amount of disutility they experience and, thus, with respect to
the extent of financial payment or exhortatory appeal necessary to overcome
their disutility. Figure 7 shows what a market supply curve for cadaveric
organs might look like when each supplier can supply only one organ. The
quantity supplied at each point reflects the number of individuals to whom the
corresponding reservation price applies. Figure 8 shows the marginal cost of
exhortation (MCE) in the absence of a market. Again, assuming one organ per
individual, the supply of organs at each point reflects the number of
individuals who will donate at the corresponding level of exhortation effort.
FIGURE 7 FIGURE 8
Market Sector Donative Sector
MCMKT MCE (PM= O)
C
Q Donative Potential Q
Supply Supply
Whether and how much the introduction of a market might reduce
donated supply depends on the degree to which individuals who would
otherwise donate would opt to receive payment instead. Let PM be the organ's
market price, P' be an individual i's reservation price, MCE be the marginal
cost of exhortation for the last organ procured, and MC be the exhortation
cost required to procure individual i's organ.
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Whereas individuals will have different P and MC, all individuals will
use the following rule in deciding whether to sell, donate, or bury the organ:
a. If Pm >- P, then individual i will sell in the market (even if MC
MC);
b. If PM < P and MCE > MC, then individual i will donate;
c. If Pm < P and MCE < MC, then individual i will neither sell nor
donate.
Suppose that individuals with a low P also had a low MC, and that those
with a high P had a high MC. Then individuals would be arrayed in the
donative sector in the same order as they are in the market. In this case,
introduction of a market would cause all those individuals for whom PM > P
to drop out of the donative sector, and MCE would shift to a curve such as A
(Figure 8).
If individuals with a low P had a high MC and those with a high P had a
low MC, then individuals in the donative sector would be arrayed inversely to
their order in the market. Thus, individuals who most prefer to donate would
be the least attracted to the market, and vice versa.6" The decision rule stated
before would apply, but now it would be individuals on the upper part of the
MCE curve who would switch to the market. In this case, MCE would shift to a
curve such as B (Figure 8).
If, P and MC are completely unrelated, then MCE would rotate left to
Curve C (Figure 8). In any case, it seems unlikely that the donative supply
would be completely unaffected by the introduction of a market.
In summary, even if Titmuss's view-that donors would cease to give if a
market were established-is mistaken, it is not obvious that Arrow's view
would be entirely correct.
61. Donors often report feeling that the tragic death of their loved one was somewhat "redeemed"
by their gift of life. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Parents Find Solace in Donating Organs, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 1993, at Cl. While some people might report revulsion at the prospect of making money from their
tragedy, there may be a price at which they would sell. However, it might be cheaper to exhort them.

